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INFORMED CONSENT AFTER COBBS*-
HAS THE PATIENT BEEN FORGOTTEN?
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body .... I
I. ITMODUCTION
Although the state has closely scrutinized the physician-patient
relationship in all civilized societies,2 it is only recently that Amer-
ican courts have held physicians liable for failing to disclose to their
patients the risks inherent in a proposed course of treatment.3 The
physician who has failed to adequately disclose the potential dan-
gers of treatment will be held liable to his patient due to the doc-
trine of informed consent.
The informed consent concept, clearly enough, separates into two
elements: information and consent. A two-fold duty is imposed:
the physician must disclose certain information about collateral
risks, and he must not proceed without consent to the risks which
were, or should have been, disclosed. 4
* Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
1. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105
N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (J. Cardozo), overruled on other grounds; Bing v.
Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
2. The history of malpractice dates back to the Code of Hammur-
abi. The Babylonian Code provided that, if a surgeon should
treat a man with a bronze lancet and cause either death or loss of
an eye, the surgeon's hands should be cut off. On the other hand,
if the surgeon treated a slave and the slave died, the surgeon
need only provide a new slave. Apparently during the Babylon-
ian days it was wise for a surgeon to limit his medical practice to
the treatment of slaves.
Pierson, Failure to Inform Patient of Nature and Hazards of Operation,
Proof No. 7, 7 Am. JuR. PROOF OF FAcTs 66, 69 (Supp. 1966); 2 DRVER &
MiES, THE BABYLoNIANN LAws 81 (1955) as cited in Note, 20 OKL. L. REV.
214, 215 (1967).
3. The medical profession makes a clear distinction between treatment
and diagnosis. See e.g., STEDmz.AN's MtDicA DIcTIoNARY 345 (diagnosis) and
1320 (treatment) (3d ed. 1972). While the cases have established a legal
duty to disclose risks of treatment, it is clear this duty to disclose extends
to the risks of diagnosis as well. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford etc. Bd.
Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957) where the court re-
ferred to the physician's duty to disclose the risks of treatment even though
the procedure in question was diagnostic.
4. Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L.
REv. 628, 630 (1970).
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This two-fold duty is imposed upon the physician because the doc-
trine of informed consent is designed to accomplish two separate
and distinct objectives, one for the benefit of the patient and the
other for the benefit of the physician.
The first objective of the doctrine is to assure the patient a source
of information to be utilized in determining which course of treat-
ment, if any, he will pursue. The right of every individual to de-
termine for himself what is to be done with his body is a funda-
mental precept of American jurisprudence.5 Thus, when a partic-
ular course of treatment is proposed, the right to decide whether
or not that treatment will be performed is the right of the patient,
not the doctor. The patient's right to make this decision gives
rise to a legal duty on the part of the doctor to adequately disclose
the risks inherent in the proposed treatment. Without this informa-
tion, the patient will be unable to make a knowledgeable decision
about what is to be done with his body. It is to guarantee the in-
dividual his right of self-determination that the law imposes a duty
on the physician to inform. 6
The second objective of the informed consent doctrine is to in-
sulate the physician from liability for battery. Whenever a person
harmfully or offensively touches another, a battery is committed.'
However, if the "victim" of the harmful touching consents to it, a
complete defense to battery is established.8 Therefore, to avoid
liability for battery, it is incumbent on the physician to obtain his
patient's consent before commencing treatment.9
The doctrine of informed consent, then, is a useful legal doctrine
for both the patient and the physician. The informational element
of the doctrine assures one seeking treatment a source of informa-
tion upon which he is able to draw in deciding if he will consent
to the treatment or not. The consensual element of the doctrine af-
fords the physician a complete defense to liability for battery. When
the physician fails to adequately inform his patient of the risks in-
5. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129,
105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (J. Cardozo), overruled on other grounds; Bing v.
Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S. 3 (1957). See also, Canter-
bury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
6. Woods v. Brunilop, 71 N.M. 221, 227, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (1962).
7. See PROSSER, LAw or TORTS, 34-37 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
8. Id.
9. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965), rehearing
denied, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966).
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herent in treatment, problems of judicial interpretation of the doc-
trine have arisen.
Neither the courts nor the commentators have been able to agree
upon the application or the standards of the informed consent doc-
trine."° This disagreement has manifested itself in three principal
areas: 1) whether liability should be based on battery or negli-
gence," 2) what legal standard should be employed in measuring
this duty to inform,12 and 3) whether an objective or subjective
standard should be employed in determining if the physician's
breach of his duty to inform caused the patient's injury. 3
10. See generally STETLER & MoaRTz, Doctor and Patient and the Law
135-38 (1962); Davis, Duty of Doctor to Inform Patient of Risks of Treat-
ment: Battery or Negligence?, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 217 (1961); Hagman, Medi-
cal Patient's Right to Know: Report on a Medical-Legal-Ethical, Empirical
Study, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 758 (1970); Karchmer, Informed Consent: A
Plaintiff's Medical Malpractice "Wonder Drug," 31 Mo. L. REV. 29 (1966);
Lund, The Doctor, the Patient, and the Truth, 19 TENN. L. REV. 344 (1946);
McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549
(1959); McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treat-
ment, 41 MINN. L. Rzv. 381 (1957); Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medi-
cal Treatment, 11 CLEV.-MAF L. REV. 249 (1962); Plante, Consent to Opera-
tive Procedures, 21 MD. L. REv. 189 (1961); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed
Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628 (1970); Comment, Informed Con-
sent to Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396 (1967); Comment, Valid
Consent to Medical Treatment: Need the Patient Know?, 4 DUQUESNE L. REV.
450 (1966); Comment, Failure to Inform as Medical Malpractice, 23 VAND.
L. REV. 754 (1970); Comment, Physician and Patient: Some Problems of
Consent, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 158 (1962); 71 DIcK. L. REV. 675 (1967); 75 HARV.
L. REV. 1445 (1962); 40 MnN. L. REV. 876 (1956); 16 N.Y. L.J. 863 (1970);
20 OKL. L. REV. 214 (1967); 109 U. PA. L. REV. 768 (1961); 21 Sw. L.J. 843
(1967); 44 TEXAS L. REv. 749 (1966); 32 TEXAs B.J. 841 (1969); 18 WEs. RES.
L. REV. 1018 (1967); 1970 Wis. L. REv. 879 (1970); 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970).
11. Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963) (battery).
Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960) (negligence), overruled on
other grounds; Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
12. Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1960) (same duty to
disclose as is the custom of physicians practicing in the same or similar
community). Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67
(1969) (full disclosure). Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (duty to disclose all information material
to the patient's decision). See also, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396, 1397 n.5 (1967)
for a list of those jurisdictions that had adopted some standard in measur-
ing the physician's duty to disclose as of 1967.
13. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1956), rehearing
denied, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966) (subjective standard). Canter-
bury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)
(objective standard).
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The California Supreme Court in the recent case of Cobbs v.
Grant14 attempted to reconcile these judicial differences. An un-
derstanding of the Cobbs case and the effect it will have on the need
for producing expert medical testimony and for proving causation
is essential for the attorney involved in litigation where the doc-
trine of informed consent is at issue.
In August, 1964, Ralph Cobbs was diagnosed as having an in-
tractable peptic duodenal ulcer which was causing him lower ab-
dominal pain and nausea. Indicating surgery was necessary, Dr.
Dudley Grant explained the nature of the operation to Mr. Cobbs
but did not disclose any of the risks inherent in the proposed sur-
gery. Following this operation, Mr. Cobbs developed a second ul-
cer and suffered serious internal hemorrhaging due to a severed ar-
tery at the hilium of the spleen. Both of these adverse conse-
quences are inherent risks in the surgery performed by Dr. Grant.
Cobbs filed a malpractice suit against Dr. Grant, alleging alterna-
tively that the doctor was negligent during the course of the oper-
ation or that the doctor had breached his duty to adequately in-
form Mr. Cobbs of the risks inherent in the surgery. With both theor-
ies of recovery submitted to the jury, Mr. Cobbs was awarded
damages on a general verdict. The supreme court held that there
was insufficient evidence for the jury to have found that Dr. Grant
negligently performed the operation. The court reversed as it was
not apparent whether the general verdict of the jury was based on
the physician's failure to inform of collateral risks or on his negli-
gent performance of the operation itself. To assist the court below
on retrial, the Cobbs opinion is primarily concerned with the doc-
trine of informed consent.15
iI. THEORY OF RECOVERY-BATTERY V. NEGLIGENCE
When a doctor breaches the duty imposed upon him by the in-
formed consent doctrine, a patient may have a cause of action based
on a theory of battery,16 or on one of negligence.' 7 The particular
circumstances surrounding the physician's breach as well as the
jurisdiction in which the plaintiff brings his case will determine
whether or not it can be based on battery or negligence. This
distinction may well be crucial to the plaintiff as it is generally
easier to plead and prove a case based on a theory of battery.
14. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
15. Id.
16. Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966).
17. Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
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The battery theory is more advantageous for the plaintiff because
expert medical testimony is not always necessary' 8 and proving
causation is relatively easy.19 Additionally, punitive damages are
possible,20 and, while not an advantage to the patient, it should be
noted that the physician's insurance may not cover intentional
torts.2 ' Under a negligence theory, however, the plaintiff has two
heavy burdens to carry: producing expert medical testimony and
proving causation. To the extent these burdens make the plain-
tiff's case more difficult to prove, it will of course be easier for the
physician to defend a negligence suit.
There are some circumstances when the patient will always be
able to base his case on a battery theory. This is where a physician
fails to obtain his patient's consent at all or when he obtains con-
sent to one form of treatment but performs another.22 For exam-
ple, if a woman consents to exploratory surgery but the doctor
actually performs a mastectomy, liability can always be based on
battery.
23
It is when the physician has obtained his patient's consent to the
treatment that is performed, but has failed to disclose the collat-
eral risks inherent in the procedure that the courts split; some base
liability on battery
24 and others negligence.
25
The reasoning of those courts finding the physician liable for bat-
tery when he fails to inform his patient of potential dangers is ei-
ther that the failure to inform vitiates the consent26 or that "unin-
formed consent is no consent."'27 Finding the consent ineffectual,
18. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
512 (1972).
19. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965), rehearing
denied, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966).
20. Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REv. 249 (1962).
21. Note, 55 CALI. L. REv. 1396, 1400 n.18 (1967).
22. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
512 (1972). Accord, PnossER, supra note 7 at 104-06; RESTATEvENT (SEcoND)
OF ToRTs § 15 comment a at 27 (1965).
23. Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955).
24. Belcher v. Carter, 13 Ohio App. 2d 113, 234 N.E.2d 311, 42 Ohio Ops.
2d 218 (1967).
25. Carmeichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971).
26. See PRossER, supra note 7, at 165.
27. Note, 20 OxL. L. REv. 214, 215 (1967).
these courts conclude that "[e]very phase of ... [the] opera-
tion from initial anesthesia to final suture, was a continuing bat-
tery for which recovery should be allowed, even if the operation
had been successful. '28  This seems to be the inevitable result, for
consent presumes knowledge of both the beneficial and detri-
mental consequences of a proposed course of action.2 It is the pa-
tient's lack of knowledge that renders the consent ineffectual, and
this should be the result whether the knowledge is kept from him
intentionally or negligently. Whenever the physician fails to
disclose the dangers of treatment, the result is the same-the pa-
tient is denied knowledge he has a right to have. Any "consent"
given under such circumstances cannot be said to be "informed."
However, the prevailing view is that liability will be based on neg-
ligence in the situation where the doctor performs the treatment
consented to, but has failed to disclose the dangers inherent in
that treatment.30 This difference in result is partially attributable
to the fact that the majoriy of courts focus their attention on the
physician's duty to inform rather than on the patient's right to
control the decision making process.
The recent case of Canterbury v. Spence31 analyzed the reason-
ing of these courts as follows:
In duty-to-disclose cases, the focus of attention is more properly
upon the nature and content of the physician's divulgence than the
patient's understanding or consent. Adequate disclosure and in-
formed consent are, of course, two sides of the same coin-the
former a sine qua non of the latter. But the vital inquiry on duty
to disclose relates to the physician's performance of an obligation,
while one of the difficulties with analysis in the term of "informed
consent" is its tendency to imply that what is decisive is the de-
gree of the patient's comprehension.3 2
The Canterbury court points out that the former (information)
is the sine qua non of the latter (consent). Thus, if the physician
breaches his duty to provide information, presumably there can
be no consent, and the physician would be liable for having per-
formed an operation for which he had not obtained the patient's
consent. The court ignores this logical result by stating that the
term "informed consent" is misleading in that it focuses attention
on the patient's comprehension of the proposed treatment rather
28. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 367, 409 P.2d 74, 82 (1965),
rehearing denied, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966) (emphasis original).
29. BLACK'S LAW DIcTiONARY 377 (4th ed. rev. 1968) (consent).
30. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
512 (1972). Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
31. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
32. Id. at 780.
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than on the physician's duty to inform. It should be remembered,
however, that it is this very right of the patient to comprehend
what is to be done with his body that gave rise to the physician's
duty to inform in the first place.33 Why the court feels attention
should be focused on the duty to inform rather than on the right
which gave it birth does not appear. Judicial attention should
properly be focused on the patient's right of bodily self-determi-
nation and the effect a breach of the physician's duty to inform
has on that right.
Those courts finding liability based on negligence often state
that the negligence theory is preferable because the malicious or
hostile intent usually associated with battery does not exist in
the "good faith" relationship between a physician and his patient. 4
Statements to this effect seem to confuse motive with intent.3 5
The Cobbs case held that the informed consent doctrine may give
rise to a cause of action based on either battery or negligence de-
pending on the circumstances of the particular case.
The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances
when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not
consented. When the patient gives permission to perform one
type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite
element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is
present.36
The court appears to be giving credence to the language used
in some cases to the effect that a hostile intent is a prerequisite to
battery. However, as stated by Dean Prosser,
The intent with which tort liability is concerned is not necessarily
a hostile intent, or desire to do any harm. Rather it is an intent to
bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in
a way that the law will not sanction. The defendant may be
liable.., even where he was seeking the plaintiff's own good.3 7
33. See text accompanying notes 5-6, supra.
34. Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REv. 249, 259 (1962). McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unau-
thorized Medical Treatment, 41 Mumx. L. REV. 381, 424 (1957).
35. See PROSSER, supra note 7, at 31.
36. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512 (1972)
(emphasis added). If there is an adverse consequence of the proposed
treatment that is inevitable as opposed to only a possibility, the failure of
the physician to warn of this inevitability will be a battery. See e.g.,
Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958)
(failure to warn that a prostate resection involved tying off sperm ducts).
37. PRossEn, supra note 7, at 31.
Further, a physician who obtains consent to amputate one leg
and negligently amputates the other will not ordinarily have a "de-
liberate intent" to do so.38 However, even though the physician
did not "deliberately intend" to cause this result, since amputating
the wrong leg is obviously a "substantially different treatment
for which consent was not obtained,"39 this would be a battery af-
ter Cobbs.
Where the doctor performs the treatment for which he has ob-
tained consent, but has failed to disclose the potential dangers in-
herent in such treatment, the Cobbs court followed the prevailing
view, holding that the plaintiff must plead his case in negligence. 40
This result obtains because the physician "may have failed to
meet his due care duty to disclose pertinent information."41
While focusing on the doctor's "due care duty to disclose," no men-
tion is made of the effect a breach of that duty will have on the
patient's right to determine what will be done with his own body.
Like the Canterbury42 court before it, the Cobbs court was more
concerned with the nature of the physician's breach of his duty to
inform than with the right that gave rise to that duty.
The courts are clearly aware of the fact that the battery theory
is preferable from the plaintiff's point of view and that the neg-
ligence theory is more favorable to the doctor. Those courts that
base liability on battery rather than negligence often do so because
they want to lift the "onerous" burdens of producing expert medi-
cal testimony and proving causation from the plaintiff's should-
ers."s The Cobbs court took a different tack, holding, for policy rea-
sons, that it is better to favor the physician rather than the plain-
tiff at the pleadings stage of litigation where informed consent is
in issue.
That this result [negligence] now appears with growing frequency
is of more than academic interest; it reflects an appreciation of sev-
eral significant consequences favoring negligence over a battery
theory.44
Two of those "significant consequences" which prompted the
court to "favor" the negligence theory over the battery theory are
38. See Sullivan v. McGraw, 118 Mich. 39, 76 N.W. 149 (1898).
39. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 239, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
512 (1972).
40. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512 (1972).
41. Id. at 241, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
42. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
43. Note, 20 OKL. L. REv. 214, 217 (1967).
44. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512 (1972). (Em-
phasis added)
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the needs for producing expert medical testimony and for proving
that the physician's failure to disclose the risks of treatment caused
the patient's injury.
III. THE STANDAPD OF CARE REQUIRED-STILL A NEED FOR EXPERTS?
The notion that it is the right of the patient and not the doctor to
decide whether or not to pursue a particular course of treatment
is at the very heart of the informed consent doctrine. It is this right
that gives rise to the duty of the physician to adequately inform
his patient of the risks inherent in any proposed therapy. Many
have argued, however, that circumstances may arise where a phy-
sician, as part of his fiduciary duty to his patient, has a privilege
not to inform his patient of the complications of treatment.45 Rec-
ognizing that no such "privilege" has ever been judicially estab-
lished, Cobbs ruled that ". . . [I]t is the prerogative of the patient,
not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which
he believes his interests lie."4 6 The court went on to establish that,
as part of his fiduciary obligation to his patient, the physician
must disclose alternative courses of treatment and the dangers in-
herent in each.47
Accepting that a physician has a fiduciary duty to inform his
patient of the collateral risks of therapy only poses the real ques-
tion-by which yardstick is that duty to be measured? The courts
have not been uniform in answering this question,48 but a majority
rule known as the "community standard" has evolved.49 The dis-
closure necessary under this standard is the same disclosure that a
medical practitioner of the same school and the same or similar
community, under the same or similar circumstances would have
45. Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis from
Patient Sick with Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TwNs. L. REV. 349 (1946).
Accord, McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical
Treatment, 41 Mnhw. L. REV. 381 (1957). Presumably, this privilege is to
be exercised when the physician feels that information regarding the pos-
sible adverse consequences of treatment will have a detrimental effect on
the patient.
46. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972).
47. Id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514 (1972).
48. See note 12, supra.
49. Kaplan v. Haines, 96 N.J. Super. 242, 232 A.2d 840 (1967), af'd,
51 N.J. 404, 241 A.2d 235 (1968). See also, Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del.
539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
made to his patient.50
Where the community standard is applied, expert medical testi-
mony is needed to establish for the jury what reasonable physicians
in the defendant's position would have done.51 The burden on the
plaintiff of producing such testimony may be made more difficult
due to the supposed "conspiracy of silence.
5 2
Cobbs rejected the majority rule as "needlessly overbroad" and
held that a physician must, as a matter of law, "disclose to his pati-
ent the potential of death or serious harm .... 5"3 This is the first
court to ever impose such a seemingly stringent standard on the
physicians practicing in its jurisdiction.5 4 The consequence of this
ruling is that expert medical testimony is no longer necessary
to establish the physician's duty to disclose risks of death or
serious bodily harm-that duty has been set by law." Thus, while
the Cobbs court placed two heavy burdens on the plaintiff by re-
quiring him to plead his case in negligence, it has ostensibly eased
the burden of producing expert medical testimony by establishing
the physician's duty to disclose as a matter of law. However, the
need for experts has only been eliminated for one purpose, i.e.,
to establish the physician's duty to disclose the risks of death or
50. Kaplan v. Haines, 96 N.J. Super. 242, 232 A.2d 840 (1967) aff'd,
51 N.J. 404, 241 A.2d 235 (1968).
51. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n.38 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
52. The "conspiracy of silence" is the somewhat unfortunate term ap-
plied to the supposed reluctance of one member of the medical profession
to be the source of evidence which may prove detrimental to another
member of the medical profession. A responsible medical journal has de-
clared, "[Tihe blunt truth is that the majority of all professional liability
claims . . . are without merit." Medicine and the Law, Medical-Legal
Problems and their Solutions, 165 J.A.M.A. 699, 700 (1967). Some quarters
of the legal profession, on the other hand, no longer speculate as to the
"conspiracy." See e.g., Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 258, 288 P.2d
1003, 1010 (1955) where a reviewing court upheld a verdict for the plain-
tiff even though the trial court judge had made a remark to the effect that
doctors were reluctant to testify regarding a fellow physician's negligence.
Further, the court said that such a remark was "merely an open recogni-
tion of the truth of the popular legend ......
53. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972).
54. In Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972) the duty to disclose is measured by the need of the
patient to know. It is quite probable that a jury would always find that a
patient's need to know included risks of death or serious harm. To this
extent, the standard adopted in Cobbs may be different from that adopted
in Canterbury only in form and not in substance.
55. Lay witness testimony can competently establish a physician's
failure to disclose particular risk information, the patient's lack of
knowledge of the risk, and the adverse consequences following the
treatment.
Id. at 792.
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serious bodily harm.56 The plaintiff will still be required to pro-
duce expert medical testimony to rebut defenses that will surely
be imposed by the defendant.
The burden of going forward with evidence of nondisclosure rests
on the plaintiff. Once such evidence has been produced, then the
burden of going forward with evidence pertaining to justification
for failure to disclose shifts to the physician. 57
These "justifications" for failing to disclose are called "defenses"
by the court.58 Thus, despite the physician's duty, as a matter of
law, to disclose risks of death or serious bodily harm, a doctor who
fails to so inform his patient may still avoid liability.
A physician may defend by asserting that the particular injury
suffered by the patient was not an inherent danger of the treat-
ment proposed. The plaintiff will be required to rebut this con-
tention with expert medical testimony, for what risks are inherent
in a given course of treatment is presumably beyond the ken of the
jury.5
9
Additionally, a physician need not disclose inherent risks "if the
procedure is simple and the danger remote and commonly appre-
ciated to be remote."60 Cobbs offers no insight into what is meant
by "remote." Again, a physician may defend by asserting that the
injury suffered by the plaintiff was only a remote possibility. To
establish this quality of "remoteness," experts will surely be called
upon by the defendant-physician. A concomitant necessity will
thus be placed upon the plaintiff to produce experts to establish
that the injury suffered was not remote.
Thus, while Cobbs has eliminated the need to establish a "com-
munity standard" by producing expert medical testimony, it has
56. Beyond this duty, the physician is obligated to disclose those risks
that would have been disclosed by a physician in good standing in similar
circumstances. Thus, if the undisclosed risk did not involve death or seri-
ous harm, expert medical testimony would be needed to establish what
physicians in good standing would have done under the circumstances.
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 244-45, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515
(1972).
57. Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515 (1972).
58. Id.
59. See McCormick, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENcE § 13 (2d ed.
1972).
60. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr.
505, 512 (1972).
created new situations where the plaintiff will be required to pro-
duce experts in order to establish that the defendant should be
liable.
In rejecting the contention that a physician should have a privi-
lege to withhold risk information from his patient, Cobbs recog-
nized that situations can arise where it may be in the best interest
of the patient not to be so informed. However, Cobbs held that a
determination of when a disclosure of risk information will "so ser-
iously upset the patient that the patient would not... [be] able to
dispassionately weigh the risks of refusing to undergo the recom-
mended treatment" is not a medical decision. 1 When a physician
interposes the defense and that risk information was withheld from
the patient because it was in the patient's best interest, Cobbs has
specifically eliminated the need for expert medical testimony. The
physician so defending will be required to "prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence he relied upon facts which would demon-
strate to a reasonable man" that disclosure was not in the best in-
terest of the patient.02 While rejecting the concept of a physician's
privilege to withhold information, the court has supplanted a rea-
sonable man test which preserves the individual's right of self-de-
termination and, at the same time, recognizes that situations may
arise where the patient is unable to exercise that choice due to his
particular psychological make-up.
IV. CAUSATION-SUBJECTIVE V. OBJECTIVE STANDARD
As in all tort actions alleging negligence, the plaintiff must not
only prove that the defendant was negligent, but that this negli-
gence was the cause of the harm suffered. In the area of informed
consent, this means that the plaintiff must prove a negative, i.e.,
that had he been informed of the risks of treatment, there would
have been no treatment performed.
A causal connection exists when, but only when, disclosure of sig-
nificant risks incidental to treatment would have resulted in a de-
cision against it. The patient obviously has no complaint if he
would have submitted to the therapy notwithstanding awareness
that the risk was one of its perils.68
It has been assumed by the older cases that the inquiry into
what would have happened had the physician not been negligent
would be determined by a subjective test,6 4 i.e., what would this
61. Id. at 246, 502 P.2d at 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
64. Id.
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patient have done had the risk been disclosed to him. Since it is the
patient's right to determine what will be done with his body, a sub-
jective inquiry into what he would have done had all facts been
known to him seems logical. Never before Canterbury had it been
suggested that the patient can only refuse treatment if the reason-
able, prudent man would have done likewise. Rather, the patient's
decision is "a matter [he] is free to decide for any reason that ap-
peals to him."6' 6 Cobbs accepted this precept when it recognized
that the decision was the patient's and not the doctor's even though
the patient may cloud that decision with his "individual subjective
fears and hopes." 66 The right of a person to protect or disregard
the health of his body is a basic right of bodily freedom and indi-
vidual choice.
7
However, in order to protect the doctor from the patient's "bit-
terness and disillusionment," Cobbs rejected the subjective stand-
ard. What the patient would have done had he been adequately
informed of the dangers of treatment is no longer controlling once
the physician has breached his duty to inform. Instead, the jury is
to consider what "a prudent person in the patient's position
[would] have decided if adequately informed of all significant
perils."
6 s
The Cobbs court is asking the jury to determine what should have
been decided, not what would have been decided in the event the
physician had met his duty of disclosure. The "sine qua non" test
usually applied to causation is employed to determine what would
have happened "but for" negligence-not what should have hap-
pened "but for" negligence.60
If the patient had been informed of risks inherent in the course
of treatment when it was initially proposed, he would have had
every right to have refused, even if such refusal had been irra-
tional by objective standards.70 But, not having been informed of
65. Id. Accord, Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965),
rehearing denied, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966); Aiken v. Clary,
396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Note, 55 CAuir. L. REV. 1396, 1411 (1967).
66. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972).
67. Note, 23 VANm. L. REV. 754, 755 (1970). (Emphasis supplied)
68. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972).
69. See PossER, supra note 7, at 239.
70. Since the patient bears the entire risk of nonnegligent injury
and is concerned with his own interests as no other person can be,
those risks, whatever subjective fears and hopes the plaintiff may
have had for refusing treatment are not given an opportunity to
function. If the patient is informed of the risks of treatment, he
can refuse for any reason he chooses; if he is not informed of the
risks of treatment, those reasons become irrelevant. The patient's
subjective determination of what will be done with his body is only
taken from him and given to the mythical reasonable man when the
physician, not the patient, has breached a duty imposed upon
him by law.
It is the patient's possible "bitterness and disillusionment" that
prompted the Cobbs court to adopt the objective standard for de-
termining causation. How the patient testifies in light of the in-
juries he has suffered should be a function of his credibility as a
witness, not a basis for adopting a new judicial standard. The
court's fear that the jury would not be able to rationally deter-
mine causation based on the testimony of a "bitter and disillu-
sioned" plaintiff could be laid to rest with a properly constructed
jury instruction. Such an instruction would direct the jury to
take into consideration the plaintiff's possible "bitterness and dis-
illusionment" in evaluating his testimony. Such factors as the ram-
ifications a refusal to have consented to treatment would have had
on the patient's future health, and the nature of the illness itself
could be included in such an instruction and thus guarantee a sound
determination of the plaintiff's credibility.
V. CONCLUSION
For policy reasons, the California Supreme Court determined
that it is better to favor the physician over the plaintiff at the plead-
ing stage of a cause of action alleging a failure on the part of the
physician to adequately disclose risks inherent in the treatment
for which he had obtained consent. By adopting a matter of law
duty on the part of the physician to disclose risks of death or ser-
ious harm, the court attempted to ease the plaintiff's burden of
producing expert medical testimony. However, by so doing, the
court created new areas where the plaintiff will inevitably be
called upon to produce experts. Finally, by adopting a subjective
test for determining causation, the court denies the patient the
right to determine, for whatever reason he chooses, what shall be
it is only fair to allow him to choose between accepting or re-
jecting the hazards of a proposed treatment even if his choice
is irrational.
Note, 55 CALiF. L. REV. 1396, 1409 (1967) (emphasis added).
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done with his body and relegates this decision to the mythical rea-
sonable man. While easing the plaintiff's burden of producing
medical experts to testify, the court has made the task of proving
causation more difficult for the plaintiff.
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